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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A. Factual History 
 Allegheny Ludlum Corporation (Allegheny Ludlum), a 
company engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing and 
selling specialty steel products, appeals from an order for 
summary judgment entered against it in the district court.  The 
appellee is Allegheny International, Inc. (Allegheny 
International), a Pennsylvania corporation formerly named 
Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc.  Until mid-1979, Allegheny 
Ludlum was an operating division of Allegheny International but 
between mid-1979 and late 1980 was its wholly-owned subsidiary.  
At that time, Allegheny Ludlum was known as the Allegheny Ludlum 
Steel Corporation (Allegheny Ludlum Steel).   
  
 In late 1980, Allegheny International sold all of the 
outstanding common stock in Allegheny Ludlum Steel to the LSC 
Corporation, an entity formed by a group of Allegheny Ludlum 
Steel's senior managers.  Following the sale, LSC Corporation was 
merged into Allegheny Ludlum Steel, which then became known as 
Allegheny Ludlum Corporation (Allegheny Ludlum).  This action 
arises out of several agreements related to Allegheny 
International's sale of Allegheny Ludlum Steel.      
 To effectuate the sale of Allegheny Ludlum Steel, 
Allegheny International and LSC entered into a stock purchase 
agreement on November 26, 1980 (the 1980 stock purchase 
agreement).1  See app. at 26-84.  Pursuant to the agreement, on 
December 26, 1980, Allegheny International sold all of Allegheny 
Ludlum Steel's common stock to LSC.  At the same time, Allegheny 
International acquired all of Allegheny Ludlum Steel's $9.00 
Participating Preferred Stock.  This controversy centers on two 
provisions of this agreement: (1) paragraph 12(d) and (e) 
regarding the disposition of any post-closing tax benefits or 
detriments to Allegheny Ludlum for pre-closing tax periods; and 
(2) paragraph 5(e) regarding certain post-closing insurance to be 
maintained by Allegheny International on behalf of Allegheny 
Ludlum. 
                     
1
.  As we have set forth above, Allegheny International formerly 
was named Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc.  Thus, the seller in 
the stock sale agreement is Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc.  
The purchaser is ALSCO Corporation rather than LSC Corporation, 
but it appears that the stock was conveyed to LSC Corporation 
which we thus will treat as the purchaser. 
  
 Paragraph 12(d) provides that LSC, now known as 
Allegheny Ludlum, would reimburse Allegheny International 
 to the extent of any tax benefit received by 
[LSC] in taxable periods subsequent to the 
Closing Time as a result of the adjustment in 
the taxable income or other tax attributes of 
[Allegheny Ludlum Steel] or [Oklahoma Tubular 
Products Company] or as a result of over 
payment of taxes for periods through and 
including the Closing Time.  The 
reimbursement required by this section shall 
be made at the time any such tax benefit is 
determined by the filing of a tax return, 
amended tax return or otherwise. 
See app. at 77.2  Paragraph 12(e) provides that Allegheny 
International will reimburse LSC for any tax detriment suffered 
by LSC after the sale "as a result of any adjustments in the 
taxable income or other tax attributes of [Allegheny Ludlum 
Steel] or [Oklahoma Tubular Products Company] for periods through 
and including the Closing Time."  Id. at 77-78.  Paragraph 5(e) 
provides that Allegheny International  
 
 will keep the insurance set forth in Exhibit 
H in full force and effect [until the closing 
time] and thereafter for a reasonable time at 
[LSC's] request provided that [LSC] shall pay 
its allocable portion of the premiums and any 
claims thereunder shall be subject to any 
deductible of [Allegheny International] (and 
if a deductible applies to such loss as well 
as to some other loss sustained by [Allegheny 
International], to an allocable portion of 
such deductible). 
                     
2
.  The parties do not discuss how Oklahoma Tubular Products 
Company is related to Allegheny International and Allegheny 
Ludlum in their briefs, and we thus conclude that the 
relationship is not germane to this case. 
  
See app. at 50.  Allegheny International had maintained property 
and casualty insurance on behalf of Allegheny Ludlum Steel at 
least since 1976.  Starting in 1976, these policies were written 
by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which charged Allegheny 
International for the cost of claims paid, an administrative cost 
adjustment, and a tax adjustment.   
 Following its acquisition by LSC, Allegheny Ludlum 
acquired certain insurance coverage in its own name which became 
effective July 1, 1981.  In a letter agreement dated August 10, 
1981 (the 1981 insurance agreement), Allegheny International and 
Allegheny Ludlum recognized that Allegheny Ludlum had 
"established its own separate property and casualty insurance 
program," but agreed that Allegheny International would continue 
to provide Allegheny Ludlum with certain specified policies and 
management services until December 31, 1981.  Id. at 86.  The 
1981 insurance agreement also provided that Allegheny Ludlum 
would be 
 solely responsible for any insurance costs 
generated by or on behalf of [Allegheny 
Ludlum] under all previous programs 
established by [Allegheny International] for 
[Allegheny Ludlum].  Such costs would include 
but not be limited to audits, retrospective 
adjustments requiring additional premium 
payment, deductible payments or absorptions, 
renewals at the direction of [Allegheny 
Ludlum], etc. 
Id.  
 In a letter dated April 13, 1983, Allegheny              
International informed Allegheny Ludlum that it had a net 
operating loss during its 1982 tax year, and that as a result, it 
  
had filed "carryback claims" for 1979 and 1980, years in which it 
had deducted the 1982 loss from its taxable income.  Id. at 750.  
Originally, Allegheny International had offset a certain portion 
of its taxable income in 1979 and 1980 with investment tax 
credits generated by Allegheny Ludlum Steel's acquisition of 
equipment.  However, because Allegheny International's subsequent 
net operating losses eliminated its taxable income for the tax 
years 1979 and 1980, it no longer needed the investment tax 
credits.  It thus informed Allegheny Ludlum that the investment 
tax credits in those years should be used by Allegheny Ludlum to 
reduce its taxable income in 1981.  Id.  The investment tax 
credits were not available directly to Allegheny International, 
because they had been generated exclusively by Allegheny Ludlum 
Steel (Allegheny Ludlum's predecessor) when it was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Allegheny International.  Id. at 750 (letter from 
Allegheny International to Allegheny Ludlum); id. at 1312 
(Allegheny Ludlum's amended income tax return for 1981 tax year). 
 Thus, in its April 1983 letter to Allegheny Ludlum, 
Allegheny International requested that Allegheny Ludlum use the 
newly available investment tax credits (previously used by 
Allegheny International for tax years 1979 and 1980) to file a 
claim for a refund for the 1981 tax year.  Id. at 750.  Allegheny 
International also requested that pursuant to paragraph 12(d) of 
the 1980 stock purchase agreement, Allegheny Ludlum reimburse it 
  
for the value of the investment tax credits and any interest 
received.  Id.3   
 Allegheny Ludlum promptly filed these claims.  Id. at 
1311.  Moreover, in a letter dated April 22, 1983, Allegheny 
Ludlum responded to Allegheny International's April 13th letter, 
and stated that "[Allegheny Ludlum] will pay any reimbursement 
due to Allegheny International, Inc. (AI) resulting from the 
carryover of [the] 1979 and 1980 investment and foreign tax 
credits to 1981 as soon as possible after [Allegheny Ludlum] 
receives its refund check from the Internal Revenue Service."  
Id. at 752.   
 It was not until March 1989, three years after the 
execution of the 1986 agreement we discuss below, that the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) finally approved Allegheny 
International's reduction of its taxable income in 1979 and 1980 
by the use of later net operating losses.  Accordingly, only then 
did the IRS notify Allegheny Ludlum that its refund claim would 
be allowed.  Id. at 1035.  In July 1989, the IRS sent Allegheny 
Ludlum a check in the amount of $5,490,363.86, reflecting the 
amount of the tax refund ($2,233,059.75) plus interest at the 
statutory rate under the Internal Revenue Code to the date of the 
payment of the refund.  Id. at 1636 (pretrial stipulations), id. 
at 801 (check).4  The IRS sent Allegheny Ludlum a second check in 
                     
3
.  The letter cites Section 12(e) but we believe that Allegheny 
International meant section 12(d). 
4
.  Allegheny International's brief states that the IRS sent 
Allegheny Ludlum checks in the amount of $5,787,665.38, 
reflecting the amount of the tax refund ($2,479,317) plus 
  
December 1989 for $307,301.52, which included the balance of the 
refund, $246,257.25, plus additional interest.  Id. at 1636 
(pretrial stipulations), id. at 802 (check).  Thus, Allegheny 
Ludlum received a total refund with interest of $5,797,665.38.5  
 Before Allegheny Ludlum obtained the refund, Allegheny 
International had filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania on February 20, 1988.  On May 
27, 1988, Allegheny Ludlum filed a claim against Allegheny 
International for reimbursement of certain tax costs pursuant to 
paragraph 12(e) of the 1980 stock purchase agreement.  Allegheny 
Ludlum and Allegheny International settled this claim with a 
stipulation dated February 27, 1989, which was approved by the 
bankruptcy court.  The stipulation fixed the value of Allegheny 
Ludlum's claim against Allegheny International and provided that 
it was subject to a setoff of any amounts owed by Allegheny 
Ludlum to Allegheny International pursuant to the 1980 stock 
purchase agreement.  See id. at 1674-76.   
 On August 9, 1989, Allegheny Ludlum informed Allegheny 
International that, based on its construction of a February 18, 
1986 settlement agreement resolving numerous disputes between the 
parties, including a dispute over insurance matters, it intended 
(..continued) 
interest at the statutory rate under the Internal Revenue Code to 
the date of the payment of the refund.  See br. at 8. 
5
.  Allegheny International's brief states that the total of 
$5,797,665.38 included $362.93 for an unrelated item.  See br. at 
12.   
  
to retain the refund the IRS sent it in July 1989.  Id. at 804.  
In particular, in 1985 Allegheny International had filed suit 
against Allegheny Ludlum in a Pennsylvania state court, the Court 
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, to recover insurance costs 
that it claimed Allegheny Ludlum owed it.  In the February 18, 
1986 agreement, Allegheny International stated that it would 
"withdraw and cause to be dismissed with prejudice as to all 
parties all legal proceedings" it initiated against Allegheny 
Ludlum, including this insurance matter.  See 1986 agreement, at 
2 (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab F).  The 1986 agreement provided in 
return that Allegheny Ludlum would "purchase and redeem from 
[Allegheny International] all of the 650,000 shares of issued and 
outstanding shares of the $9.00 participating Preferred Stock . . 
. of [Allegheny Ludlum] owned by [Allegheny International] for an 
aggregate consideration of 37 million dollars."  Id. at 1.  This 
redemption agreement had the advantage of effectuating a clean 
break between the corporations including the termination of 
Allegheny International's representation on the Allegheny Ludlum 
board of directors. 
 Finally, the 1986 agreement stated that Allegheny 
International would release Allegheny Ludlum from certain claims.  
Pursuant to the agreement, on February 28, 1986, Allegheny 
International delivered a release to Allegheny Ludlum.  The first 
clause of this document contains broad language seemingly 
releasing Ludlum from any and all claims arising before February 
19, 1986.  The second clause, however, qualifies the first by 
  
excepting certain obligations under the November 26, 1980 
agreement.  
 The language of this release is virtually identical to 
the language which the 1986 agreement prescribed for the release.  
See app. at 109-10.  While the release refers to the agreement 
having been dated February 19, 1986, rather than February 18, 
1986, that one-day difference is not significant, as it simply 
reflects the fact that Allegheny International's acceptance of 
the agreement was dated February 19, 1986.6  The resolution of 
this action turns in large part on the construction of this 
release.   
 
 B. Procedural History 
           Allegheny International initiated this action for 
breach of contract and unjust enrichment against Allegheny Ludlum 
on November 28, 1989.  However, pursuant to reorganization 
proceedings in the bankruptcy court, Sunbeam-Oster Company, Inc. 
has acquired Allegheny International's assets and thus it is 
prosecuting this action for Allegheny International, which 
nevertheless remains the named plaintiff.  Notwithstanding 
Sunbeam-Oster's asset acquisition, it appears that Allegheny 
International's corporate existence has not been terminated, as 
the Pennsylvania Department of State certified on July 12, 1993, 
that it is an existing Pennsylvania corporation.   
                     
6
.  Sections 12(a)(ii) and (iii) relate to inspection of records 
and certain post-closing undertakings not germane to this 
litigation. 
  
 Relying on the 1980 stock purchase agreement, Allegheny 
International seeks to recover the value of the refund received 
by Allegheny Ludlum and certain insurance costs incurred by 
Allegheny International after March 1, 1986.  Allegheny 
International began the case as an adversary proceeding in the 
bankruptcy reorganization of In re: Allegheny Int'l, Inc., et 
al., Case No. 88-00448 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.).  After Allegheny 
International filed its complaint, Allegheny Ludlum filed an 
answer, demanded a jury trial, made a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings based on the 1986 settlement agreement, and made a 
motion to transfer Allegheny International's action to the 
district court.  See Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum 
Steel Corp., 920 F.2d 1127, 1130 (3d Cir. 1990).  The bankruptcy 
court denied Allegheny Ludlum's motion to transfer the case to 
district court.  Id. at 1128-30.  The district court then 
dismissed Allegheny Ludlum's appeal from that decision.  Id. at 
1131.  The district court also denied Allegheny Ludlum's motion 
for withdrawal of reference of the adversary action.  Id.  On 
further appeal, we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Allegheny 
Ludlum's appeals from: (1) the district court's dismissal of 
Allegheny Ludlum's appeal of the bankruptcy court's refusal to 
transfer the case; and (2) the district court's denial of 
Allegheny Ludlum's motion for withdrawal of reference of the 
adversary proceeding.  Id. at 1129.    
 One year later, in November 1991, before the bankruptcy 
court ruled on Allegheny's motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
the district court withdrew the reference to the bankruptcy 
  
court, and referred the case to a magistrate judge for pretrial 
proceedings.  In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
Allegheny Ludlum asserted that the 1986 settlement agreement and 
the resulting release executed by Allegheny International barred 
Allegheny International's claims against Allegheny Ludlum for the 
tax refund and for insurance costs.  See app. at 1379-83 (motion 
for judgment on the pleadings).  In addition, Allegheny Ludlum 
maintained that Allegheny International's claim for insurance 
costs was "barred by reason of principles of res 
judicata/collateral estoppel" because, pursuant to the 1986 
agreement between the parties, the state court entered an order 
dismissing with prejudice Allegheny International's 1985 
insurance costs claim.  Id. at 1383-84.  Allegheny Ludlum argued 
that the claim for insurance costs was precluded, because in the 
1985 action which the state court dismissed with prejudice, 
Allegheny International had sought a declaratory judgment holding 
Allegheny Ludlum liable for future insurance claims. 
 On April 28, 1992, the magistrate judge recommended 
that the district court deny Allegheny Ludlum's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and allow the case to proceed to 
discovery.  See report (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab C).  Though 
Allegheny Ludlum filed objections to the report, on May 13, 1992, 
the district court issued a memorandum order denying Allegheny 
Ludlum's motion and adopting the magistrate's report as its 
opinion.  See May 13, 1992 district court order (Allegheny Ludlum 
br. Tab D).  The magistrate judge's report concludes that 
Allegheny Ludlum was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings 
  
based on the release because: (1) the release does not cover 
"claim[s] based on Allegheny Ludlum's failure to perform in the 
future under any earlier contract"; (2) "[i]n applying this 
language [in the release], the court or a trier of fact, must 
determine when plaintiff's claims accrued"; and (3) this question 
could not be resolved "solely on the basis of the pleadings."  
See report, at 7 (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab C).  The report also 
concluded that the dismissal with prejudice of Allegheny 
International's 1985 state court suit for insurance costs did not 
entitle Allegheny Ludlum to judgment on the pleadings with regard 
to Allegheny International's insurance costs claim.  The 
magistrate judge relied on Allegheny International's contention 
that it was seeking reimbursement only for insurance costs it 
incurred on Allegheny Ludlum's behalf "in and after 1989" which 
"thus were not part of that state law action."  Id. at 10.7  
According to the magistrate judge's report, this allegation 
raised a question of material fact which precluded the court from 
granting Allegheny Ludlum's motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
Id.  
 Allegheny Ludlum then expanded its defense to Allegheny 
International's complaint, as it filed a motion for summary 
judgment with supporting affidavits on June 14, 1993, alleging 
that it was entitled to summary judgment based on the 1986 
agreement, the resulting release executed by Allegheny 
                     
7
.  The 1989 date is incorrect as Allegheny International is 
seeking reimbursement for costs since 1986. 
  
International, and the state court's entry of an order dismissing 
with prejudice Allegheny International's 1985 insurance costs 
claim.  See app. at 131-43.  On June 28, 1993, Allegheny Ludlum 
filed a second, separate "Motion for Summary Judgment Challenging 
Sunbeam-Oster Company, Inc.'s Right to Prosecute This Action," 
asserting that Sunbeam-Oster Company, Inc., which alleged that it 
was Allegheny International's successor in interest, had not 
established that it was the legal owner of the claims asserted 
against Allegheny Ludlum.  Id. at 427-30.  Also on June 28, 1993, 
Allegheny International filed a motion for summary judgment with 
supporting affidavits and other documents.  Id. at 238-40.   
 On April 7, 1994, the district court issued a judgment 
order and memorandum opinion denying both of Allegheny Ludlum's 
motions for summary judgment, granting Allegheny International's 
motion for summary judgment, and awarding Allegheny International 
the damages it requested plus prejudgment interest and 
declaratory relief with respect to future tax benefits received 
by Allegheny Ludlum and insurance costs Allegheny Ludlum incurred 
on its behalf.  See Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum 
Steel Corp., No. 91-1959, slip op. (W.D. Pa. April 7, 1994)  
[hereinafter Allegheny Int'l, Inc., slip op.].8  The district 
court based its decision on the law of the case because it viewed 
its earlier decision denying Allegheny Ludlum's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings as already resolving the meaning of the 
                     
8
.  The district court also denied Allegheny Ludlum's motion for 
sanctions and Allegheny International's motion for leave to file 
an amended pretrial statement. 
  
release language and the res judicata effect of Allegheny 
International's 1985 state court suit for insurance costs.  
Accordingly, the district court would not revisit these issues 
absent "extraordinary circumstances."  See Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 
slip op. at 16.   
 In its earlier decision, the district court had 
concluded as a matter of law that the language of the release was 
unambiguous and that it excluded claims based on Allegheny 
Ludlum's "failure to perform . . . after February 1986, under any 
earlier contract."  Id. at 14.  The district court adhered to its 
earlier construction of the release "as the law of the case" 
because: (1) it already had interpreted it as a matter of law; 
and (2) Allegheny Ludlum did not allege that the 1986 agreement 
and the release were ambiguous, "but rather that [the magistrate 
judge], and this Court, misunderstood the clear and unambiguous 
import of these instruments."  Id. at 20.   
 The district court concluded that although it had not 
expressly decided the res judicata effect of the dismissal of the 
1985 state court suit, it had done so "by necessary implication."  
Id. at 15.  The district court reasoned that "[t]he materiality 
of the disputed factual issue . . . precluding the granting of 
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [was] 
necessarily grounded [on the] legal conclusion that res judicata 
will not bar an insurance claim based on insurance payments not 
forming part of the dismissed state court action."  Id. at 15 
(citations omitted).  The district court adhered to this earlier 
  
decision because it concluded that the decision was not "clearly 
erroneous."  Id. at 24.     
 Thus, the district court concluded that based on its 
earlier decision, Allegheny International's claims were not 
barred.  Then, applying the legal conclusions it had reached in 
its earlier decision, the district court held that because 
Allegheny International's tax claim accrued after February 1986 
and its insurance costs were incurred after March 1, 1986, 
Allegheny International was entitled to recover the tax benefits 
and insurance costs it claimed under the 1980 stock purchase 
agreement and the 1981 insurance agreement, respectively.  Id. at 
28-29.   
 Accordingly, the district court entered judgment in 
favor of Allegheny International in the amount of $7,476,499.97 
with respect to its tax refund claim and $508,073.70 with respect 
to its insurance cost claim.  See April 7, 1994 district court 
order (Allegheny Ludlum Br. Tab A).  The former amount was the 
sum of five figures: (1) $5,490,363.86 (the IRS check dated 
7/20/89); (2) $1,317,687.20 (interest on that amount from 8/1/89 
to 7/31/93); (3) $307,301.52 (the IRS check dated 12/11/89 minus 
$362.93 for an unrelated amount paid to Allegheny Ludlum by the 
IRS); (4) $66,022.39 (interest on this sum from 1/1/90 to 
7/31/93); and (5) $295,125 (interest from 8/1/93 to 4/7/94).  The 
latter amount was the sum of $500,505 in insurance costs incurred 
by Allegheny International on behalf of Allegheny Ludlum and 
$7,568.70 in administrative fees and taxes incurred by Allegheny 
International on behalf of Allegheny Ludlum.  Id.  The district 
  
court also ordered that: (1) future tax benefits received by 
Allegheny Ludlum "which relate to tax periods prior to [its sale] 
are to be refunded to [Allegheny International] pursuant to the 
terms of the November 26, 1980 Stock Purchase Agreement"; and (2) 
"all future insurance costs incurred by [Allegheny International] 
which are attributable to [Allegheny Ludlum's] operations and 
which relate to incidents, claims or facts arising or occurring 
between 1976 and July 1, 1981, are to be paid by [Allegheny 
Ludlum] under the terms of the August 10, 1981 Insurance 
Agreement."  Id. 
 The district court denied Allegheny Ludlum's motion for 
summary judgment challenging Sunbeam-Oster Company, Inc.'s right 
to prosecute the case because the court concluded that "by 
bringing [the motion] as late in the litigation as it [did,] 
[Allegheny Ludlum] waived any such defense."  Allegheny Int'l, 
Inc., slip op. at 31 (citing 6A Charles A. Wright, et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1554, at 406-07 (1990)).  
Finally, the district court denied Allegheny Ludlum's motion for 
the imposition of sanctions on Allegheny International due to its 
alleged failure to allow meaningful discovery, noting "[i]n 
particular" that Allegheny Ludlum "failed to establish any 
prejudice in its defense against the insurance cost claim as a 
result of [Allegheny International's] alleged discovery 
shortcomings."  Id. at 34-35.  Allegheny Ludlum then appealed.  
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1334(a) and 157(d), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
  
 
 II. DISCUSSION 
 
 A.  The Release 
 Allegheny International claims that the 1980 stock 
purchase agreement entitled it to reimbursement for the tax 
refund received by Allegheny Ludlum in 1989, and that both the 
1980 stock purchase agreement and the 1981 insurance agreement 
entitled it to reimbursement for the insurance costs it has 
incurred on Allegheny Ludlum's behalf since March 1, 1986.  
Allegheny Ludlum bases one of its defenses to these claims on the 
release executed by Allegheny International in February 1986 
pursuant to the 1986 stock redemption agreement.  According to 
Allegheny Ludlum, the release "includes all claims for Allegheny 
Ludlum's breach of any contractual obligation that was to be 
performed after February 19, 1986."  See Allegheny Ludlum br. at 
24.  Allegheny Ludlum argues that it was not obligated to 
reimburse Allegheny International for the tax refund until the 
IRS made the refund in 1989 and that it was not obligated to 
reimburse Allegheny International for insurance costs incurred 
after March 1, 1986, as that date is after February 19, 1986.  
Id. at 24-25.  Thus, it is Allegheny Ludlum's position that the 
release bars both Allegheny International's tax refund claim and 
its insurance costs claim.   
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
grant of summary judgment.  See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. 
v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), cert. 
  
denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993).  Therefore, we must determine 
whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that [Allegheny International] is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 'The moving party has the initial burden of 
identifying the evidence that demonstrates 
the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact, [but] the respondent (the "non-movant") 
must establish the existence of each element 
on which it bears the burden of proof.' 
FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 860 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting J.F. 
Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921, 111 S.Ct. 1313 (1991)).  
"[I]n applying this standard, 'all inferences must be drawn 
against the movant, . . . and in favor of the nonmovant.'"  Id. 
at 860 (quoting Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 
853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988)).  However, "'where the movant 
has produced evidence in support of its motion for summary 
judgment, the nonmovant cannot rest on the allegations of 
pleadings and must do more than create some metaphysical doubt.'"  
Id. (quoting Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1230). 
 The 1980 stock purchase agreement states that it "shall 
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."  See app. at 83.  Although the 
1981 insurance agreement, the 1986 agreement, and the release do 
not identify the governing law, the parties have briefed the case 
  
under Pennsylvania law, which we thus apply.  See Langer v. 
Monarch Life Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).9 
 "Under Pennsylvania law, ambiguous writings are 
interpreted by the fact finder and unambiguous writings are 
interpreted by the court as a question of law."  Mellon Bank, 
N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 n.10 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law) (citing Broker Title Co. 
v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174 (3d Cir. 
1979)).  Thus, the first question "[c]ourts are left with [is] 
the difficult issue of determining as a matter of law which 
category written contract terms fall into - clear or ambiguous."  
Id. at 1011 (citing United Refining Co. v. Jenkins, 189 A.2d 574, 
580 (Pa. 1963); O'Farrell v. Steel City Piping Co., 403 A.2d 1319 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).  If the court determines that a contract 
is clear, or unambiguous, then it construes the contract as a 
matter of law.  Id. at 1011 n.10.  See also Kroblin Refrigerated 
Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1986) ("It 
is well settled that unambiguous writings are construed as a 
matter of law.") (applying Pennsylvania law) (citing Ram 
Construction Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1052 
(3d Cir. 1984); Mellon, 619 F.2d at 1011 n.10).  Therefore,  
because the district court determined that the release was 
                     
9
.  It is difficult to understand how any other law could apply, 
as Allegheny International, Allegheny Ludlum, and the ALSCO 
Corporation, which was the purchaser named in the November 26, 
1980 agreement, are Pennsylvania corporations and the 
transactions involved in this case all took place in 
Pennsylvania.  See n.1, infra. 
  
unambiguous, the court construed it as a matter of law.  See 
Allegheny Int'l, Inc., slip op. at 13-14, n.9, & 20.  See also 
USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 436-37 (3d Cir. 
1993).  We exercise plenary review over these legal 
determinations. 
  "A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably 
susceptible of different constructions and capable of being 
understood in more than one sense."  Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal 
Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. 1986) (citations omitted).  See 
also Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., No. 94-
1517, slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 1994); Langer, 879 F.2d at 
80 (quoting Hutchison's definition of ambiguity).  The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has identified two types of ambiguity: (1) 
patent ambiguity, and (2) latent ambiguity, and has defined them 
as follows: 
 '[a] patent ambiguity is that which appears 
on the face of the instrument, and arises 
from the defective, obscure, or insensible 
language used.'  Black's Law Dictionary 105 
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).  In contrast, a latent 
ambiguity arises from extraneous or 
collateral facts which make the meaning of a 
written agreement uncertain although the 
language thereof, on its face, appears clear 
and unambiguous.  Easton v. Washington County 
Ins. Co., 391 Pa. 28, 137 A.2d 332 (1957). 
Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. 1982).   
 Thus, we will begin by examining the language of the 
release to determine whether it contains a patent ambiguity.  The 
release states the following:  
 [Allegheny International] hereby releases  
[Allegheny Ludlum] from any and all claims 
and causes of action (including the 
  
litigation referred to in Section 3(b) of the 
aforesaid letter agreement dated as of 
February 19, 1986) attributable to events or 
agreements occurring prior to February 19, 
1986, whether or not arising out of the 
agreement dated November 26, 1980, pursuant 
to which [Allegheny Ludlum] was purchased 
from [Allegheny International,] provided; 
however, that the release shall not release 
any claim or cause of action based on the 
failure of [Allegheny Ludlum] [or] LSC 
Corporation ("LSC") . . . to perform any 
obligation which [Allegheny Ludlum] [or] LSC 
. . . has to [Allegheny International] under 
said agreement dated November 26, 1980 (other 
than obligations under Sections 12(a)(ii) and 
(iii) thereof) or under any other written 
obligation to [Allegheny International] which 
was to have been performed by [Allegheny 
Ludlum] [or] LSC . . . at or prior to 
February 19, 1986.  
See release, at 1-2 (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab G). 
 As the district court recognized, the release consists 
of two clauses.  The first clause contains broad language 
releasing Allegheny Ludlum from: 
 any and all claims and causes of action  
[including Allegheny International's 1985 
insurance cost suit] attributable to events 
or agreements occurring prior to February 19, 
1986, whether or not arising out of the [1980 
stock purchase agreement], pursuant to which 
[Allegheny Ludlum] was purchased from 
[Allegheny International]. 
See Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab G, at 1.  This language in itself is 
unambiguous and, if it stood alone, we would conclude it covers 
both Allegheny International's tax refund claim and its insurance 
  
cost claim, as these claims arise from "agreements occurring 
prior to February 19, 1986."10  
 However, the second clause of the release contains 
"language which limits the apparent carte blanche release" 
contained in the first clause.  See magistrate judge's report at 
7 (Allegheny Ludlum's br. Tab C).  The second clause provides 
that 
 the release shall not release any claim or 
cause of action based on the failure of 
[Allegheny Ludlum] to perform any obligation 
which [Allegheny Ludlum] has to [Allegheny 
International] under said agreement dated 
November 26, 1980 (other than obligations 
under Sections 12(a)(ii) and (iii) thereof) 
or under any other written obligation to 
[Allegheny International] which was to have 
been performed by [Allegheny Ludlum] at or 
prior to February 19, 1986.  
See release, at 1-2 (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab G).  As we noted 
above, the district court held that this clause excluded from the 
                     
10
.  It is undisputed that Allegheny International's claims are 
based on the 1980 stock purchase agreement and the 1981 insurance 
agreement.  Allegheny International argues that the first clause 
of the release does not bar its claims because it contains "no 
clear and unequivocal expression of an intent" to release claims 
based on a failure to perform in the future obligations which 
arise out of agreements reached prior to February 19, 1986.  See 
Allegheny International br. at 22.  We disagree.  As Allegheny 
Ludlum points out, the first clause of the release "clearly 
demonstrates the parties' intention that plaintiff released 
Allegheny Ludlum from 'any and all claims and causes of action,' 
regardless when they arose or when performance [was] due, so long 
as those claims 'were attributable to events or agreements 
occurring prior to February 19, 1986.'"  See Allegheny Ludlum 
reply br. at 4.  Our conclusion is consistent with the magistrate 
judge's report, which the district court adopted, which stated 
that if the first clause "were the full extent of the release 
[Allegheny Ludlum's] claims would be well-founded."  See report, 
at 7 (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab C).      
  
release claims based on Allegheny Ludlum's "failure to perform . 
. . after February 1986, under any earlier contract."  See 
Allegheny Int'l, Inc., slip op. at 14 (emphasis added); 
magistrate judge's report, at 7 (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab C) 
("Specifically, the release excludes from coverage any claim 
based on Allegheny Ludlum's failure to perform in the future 
under any earlier contract.").   
 The district court's construction of the second clause 
in the release is inconsistent with the constructions advanced by 
both Allegheny International and Allegheny Ludlum.  See Allegheny 
Ludlum reply br. at 8.  Moreover, the district court's 
construction of the second clause is inconsistent with language 
in the clause, namely the phrase: "which was to have been 
performed by [Allegheny Ludlum] at or prior to February 19, 
1986."  See release, at 1-2 (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab G).  
Allegheny International takes the position that this phrase 
modifies only the phrase which immediately precedes it, namely, 
"any other written obligation to [Allegheny International]," and 
not obligations under the 1980 stock purchase agreement.  See 
Allegheny International br. at 23, 26.  Thus, Allegheny 
International maintains that the second clause exempts from the 
release any claim based on Allegheny Ludlum's failure to perform 
in the future (i.e. subsequent to the February 1986 execution of 
the release) any obligation under the 1980 stock purchase 
agreement, but does not adopt the district court's view that the 
second clause exempts from the release any claim based on 
Allegheny Ludlum's "failure to perform . . . after February 1986, 
  
under any earlier contract."  See Allegheny Int'l, Inc., slip op. 
at 14 (emphasis added); magistrate judge's report, at 7 
(Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab C).   
 In fact, Allegheny International indicates that the 
release bars claims based on Allegheny Ludlum's failure to 
perform after February 1986 under written obligations other than 
the 1980 stock purchase agreement, and that the second clause of 
the release only preserves claims arising out of such other 
written obligations if they accrued "prior to the date of the 
Release."  See Allegheny International br. at 23 ("The second 
part of the proviso relates to [Allegheny Ludlum's] obligations 
under agreements other than the [1980 stock purchase 
agreement]").  Nonetheless, Allegheny International argues that 
the district court reached the correct result because: (1) the 
second clause exempts from the release any claim based on 
Allegheny Ludlum's failure to perform in the future (i.e., 
subsequent to the February 1986 execution of the release) any 
obligation under the 1980 stock purchase agreement, id. at 22-24; 
and (2) thus its claims based on Allegheny Ludlum's failure to 
reimburse it for the 1989 tax refund and the insurance costs 
Allegheny International incurred after March 1, 1986, are not 
barred by the release.   
 Unlike Allegheny International, Allegheny Ludlum takes 
the position that the phrase "which was to have been performed by 
[Allegheny Ludlum] at or prior to February 19, 1986," modifies 
more than the phrase which immediately precedes it, namely, "any 
other written obligation."  See Allegheny Ludlum br. at 23-24.  
  
According to Allegheny Ludlum, it modifies the phrase "any 
obligation which [Allegheny Ludlum] has to [Allegheny 
International]" under the 1980 stock purchase agreement and its 
obligations under "any other written obligation to [Allegheny 
International]."  Id.  Thus, Allegheny Ludlum argues that the 
second clause preserves only those claims based on obligations 
which were to be performed on or before February 19, 1986.  Based 
on this reading of the second clause of the release, the release 
bars Allegheny International's claims based on Allegheny Ludlum's 
failure to reimburse it for the 1989 tax refund and the insurance 
costs Allegheny International incurred after March 1, 1986, 
because these claims are not based on obligations that Allegheny 
Ludlum was to have performed prior to February 19, 1986.11 
 We acknowledge that the use of the conjunction "or" to 
separate the phrase "under [the 1980 stock purchase agreement]" 
from the phrase "under any other written obligation" could be 
construed to indicate that the phrase "which was to have been 
performed by [Allegheny Ludlum] at or prior to February 19, 1986" 
modifies only the phrase "any other written obligation."   
However, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Dilks v. 
Flohr Chevrolet, Inc., 192 A.2d 682, 685 (Pa. 1963), 
                     
11
.  As Allegheny Ludlum points out, "[i]t is undisputed that the 
time for Allegheny Ludlum's performance with respect to the tax 
refund claim was not until 1989 after it received the tax refund 
from the Internal Revenue Service," and that "the time for 
Allegheny Ludlum's performance of the insurance cost 
reimbursement in question did not arise until those costs were 
incurred at various times after March 1, 1986."  See Allegheny 
Ludlum br. at 24-25 (citing app. at 1422, 284-85, 1492). 
  
 [w]ords and phrases on one side of the word 
'or' may, and often do, modify and apply to 
words and phrases on the other side of the 
word 'or' in the same sentence. 
Moreover, in Hutchison, the court held that a paragraph in a 
lease was ambiguous, because it was susceptible to both the 
appellant's construction of the paragraph, which "rest[ed] wholly 
on the use of the word 'or' to connect the series [of words]," 
and the appellee's construction, which was "not totally 
consistent with the use of the word 'or,' but seem[ed] more 
natural."  Hutchison, 519 A.2d at 390.  In our view, it seems 
unnatural to construe the second clause of the release to 
preserve claims based on future obligations under one contract 
between the parties and claims based on past obligations under 
other contracts between the parties.  Thus, the mere use of the 
conjunction "or" does not render the clause unambiguous, and we 
conclude that the clause is susceptible to more than one meaning.
  
 Allegheny International makes two other arguments to 
support its contention that the second clause of the release is 
unambiguous.  First, it argues that the language of the second 
clause of the release is not reasonably susceptible to Allegheny 
Ludlum's construction because "[t]o read the phrase 'to have been 
performed . . . at or prior to February 19, 1986' as referring to 
[the 1980 stock purchase agreement] turns the first clause of the 
proviso into mere surplusage" in violation of "standard rules of 
contract construction."  See Allegheny International br. at 26.  
We do not believe that this argument is determinative because 
  
Allegheny International's construction of the second clause of 
the release also seems to turn a portion of the first clause into 
surplusage. 
 Allegheny International next argues that the second 
clause of the release is not reasonably susceptible to Allegheny 
Ludlum's construction because "[u]nder [Allegheny] Ludlum's 
construction, no contractual claims, including the insurance 
claims which were in litigation at the time the Release was 
executed, were released."  Id. at 25.  According to Allegheny 
International, such a construction of the second clause of the 
release "lead[s] to an absurdity" and thus should be rejected in 
favor of its own interpretation which "'will effectuate the 
reasonable result intended.'"  Id. at 25 (quoting Laudig v. 
Laudig, 624 A.2d 651, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct.) appeal denied, 634 
A.2d. 224 (Pa. 1993)). 
 Allegheny International argues that Allegheny Ludlum's 
construction "lead[s] to an absurdity," because it is 
inconsistent with the express provision in the 1986 agreement 
(also referenced in the first clause of the release), which 
provides for the dismissal with prejudice of all proceedings 
pending between the parties including the 1985 insurance costs 
suit.  We agree that Allegheny Ludlum's construction is 
inconsistent with the dismissal with prejudice of pending 
insurance cost proceedings because such claims are based on 
obligations under the 1980 stock purchase agreement which were 
supposed to have been performed before February 19, 1986.  Under 
Allegheny Ludlum's construction, the second clause of the release 
  
preserves claims based on obligations under the 1980 stock 
purchase agreement if these obligations were to be performed "at 
or prior to February 19, 1986."   
 This argument also is not determinative, however, 
because Allegheny International's construction of the second 
clause suffers from the same infirmity.  The insurance costs 
proceedings pending when the 1986 agreement and release were 
executed also were based on the 1981 insurance agreement.  Thus, 
Allegheny International's construction of the second clause of 
the release to preserve claims based on obligations under other 
agreements if the obligations were supposed to be performed "at 
or prior to February 19, 1986" also seems inconsistent with the 
dismissal with prejudice of pending insurance cost proceedings. 
 Overall, we conclude that the language of the second 
clause of the release is "reasonably susceptible" to both 
Allegheny International's construction and Allegheny Ludlum's 
construction.  Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d at 390 
(citations omitted).12  Thus, the release is patently ambiguous, 
and we must reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Allegheny International on this basis. 
 Because of our holding that the contract is patently 
ambiguous, we do not reach the question of whether the contract 
                     
12
.  We reject Allegheny Ludlum's argument that its construction 
of the second clause of the release is "the only plausible 
reading," and that, therefore, the release is unambiguous.  See 
Allegheny Ludlum br. at 19. 
  
is latently ambiguous as well.13  As a corollary, we also need 
not decide the scope of extraneous evidence admissible under 
Pennsylvania law to demonstrate that a contract is latently 
ambiguous.  Of course, upon remand, the trier of fact must look 
to extraneous evidence to determine the contracting parties' 
intent.  The scope of extraneous evidence admissible to interpret 
the meaning of an ambiguous contract (as distinguished from 
determining whether or not the contract is in fact ambiguous) is 
not before us on this appeal, and in the first instance should be 
decided by the district court. 
  Allegheny Ludlum urges that we should go further than 
simply reversing the summary judgment in favor of Allegheny 
International, as it argues that even if we conclude that the 
release is ambiguous, we should grant its motion for summary 
judgment because Allegheny International failed to meet its 
burden to respond to Allegheny Ludlum's motion under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56.  See Allegheny Ludlum br. at 21-22.  According to 
Allegheny Ludlum, it is entitled to summary judgment because 
Allegheny International failed to refute the evidence of the 
parties' intent contained in affidavits it submitted which, if 
accepted, would establish that the release bars this action.  Id. 
However, we have no need to describe these affidavits in detail  
because there is extrinsic evidence which tends to support a 
                     
13
.  In fact we cannot reach that point because an agreement is 
latently ambiguous only when extraneous or collateral facts make 
uncertain language which facially is clear and unambiguous.  
Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d at 663.  Thus, by definition, an 
agreement can be latently ambiguous only if it is patently clear. 
  
conclusion that the release does not bar this action.  See, e.g., 
app. at 1325-26 (May 5, 1988 letter from Allegheny Ludlum to 
Allegheny International recognizing that Allegheny International 
primarily was responsible for protesting the IRS's initial 
disallowance of the tax refund for which Allegheny International 
now seeks reimbursement), id. at 1675 (February 1989 stipulation 
recognizing that Allegheny Ludlum still may have obligations to 
Allegheny International under the 1980 stock purchase agreement).  
Thus, a dispute of fact remains.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
denial of Allegheny Ludlum's motion for summary judgment on 
Allegheny International's tax refund claim, and unless we 
determine that the dismissal with prejudice of Allegheny 
International's 1985 suit for insurance costs precludes the 
insurance costs claim, we also will affirm the denial of 
Allegheny Ludlum's motion for summary judgment on that claim.   
 
 B.  Dismissal of the State Case 
 As we have indicated, in 1985 Allegheny International 
filed suit to recover insurance costs that it claimed Allegheny 
Ludlum owed it under the 1980 stock purchase agreement and the 
1981 insurance agreement.  However, in the 1986 agreement, 
Allegheny International stated that it would "withdraw and cause 
to be dismissed with prejudice as to all parties all legal 
proceedings" pending between Allegheny International and 
Allegheny Ludlum including its insurance claim.  See 1986 
agreement, at 2 (Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab F).  Subsequently, on 
February 28, 1986, the state court issued an order approving a 
  
stipulation by the parties dismissing the 1985 suit with 
prejudice.  See app. at 425.  Allegheny International's 1985 suit 
sought reimbursement for insurance costs it already had incurred 
on behalf of Allegheny Ludlum as well as a declaratory judgment 
entitling it to reimbursement for insurance costs it would incur 
on Allegheny Ludlum's behalf in the future.  Id. at 155-64.  In 
its present insurance costs claim, Allegheny International seeks 
reimbursement for the insurance costs it has incurred on 
Allegheny Ludlum's behalf since March 1, 1986.  Id. at 1647-50 
(Allegheny International's Third Amended Pretrial Statement). 
 The magistrate judge concluded that the dismissal with 
prejudice of Allegheny International's 1985 state court suit for 
insurance costs did not entitle Allegheny Ludlum to judgment on 
the pleadings because Allegheny International sought 
reimbursement only for insurance payments it made on Allegheny 
Ludlum's behalf "in and after 1989" which "thus were not part of 
that state law action."14  See magistrate judge's report, at 10 
(Allegheny Ludlum br. Tab C).  According to the magistrate's 
report, this allegation raised a question of material fact which 
precluded granting a judgment on the pleadings.  Id.   
 Allegheny Ludlum argues that the district court "erred 
in ruling, as a matter of law, that the dismissal with prejudice 
of the 1985 Insurance Lawsuit did not bar relitigation of 
[Allegheny International's] insurance cost claim."  See Allegheny 
                     
14
.  We are confident that the magistrate judge intended to 
indicate 1986. 
  
Ludlum br. at 37.  Allegheny Ludlum concedes that Allegheny 
International's present insurance costs claim does not seek 
reimbursement for any costs it incurred on behalf of Allegheny 
Ludlum prior to the dismissal of its 1985 suit.  Id. at 39.  
However, according to Allegheny Ludlum, the dismissal of the 1985 
suit bars Allegheny International's present insurance costs suit 
because the 1985 suit sought not only reimbursement for insurance 
costs Allegheny International already had incurred, but also a 
judgment declaring that all future claims costs it would incur on 
Allegheny Ludlum's behalf were to be paid pursuant to the 1981 
insurance agreement.  Id.; see app. at 163.  Our review of the 
district court's conclusion is plenary. 
 Federal courts must "give the same preclusive effect to 
state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the 
courts of the State from which the judgments emerged."  Kremer v. 
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889 
(1982) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738) (footnote omitted); see also 
Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014, 103 S.Ct. 1256 (1983).  This 
principle is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which provides that 
state court judgments: 
 shall have the same full faith and credit in 
every court within the United States and its 
Territories and Possessions as they have by 
law or usage in the courts of such State. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of res judicata 
holds that "'a final valid judgment upon the merits by a court of 
competent jurisdiction bars any future suit between the parties 
  
or their privies, on the same cause of action.'" Keystone Bldg. 
Corp. v. Lincoln Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 360 A.2d 191, 194 (Pa. 
1976) (citations omitted). 
 Application of the doctrine of res judicata 
requires the concurrence of four elements.  
They are: (1) identity of the thing sued for; 
(2) identity of the cause of action; (3) 
identity of persons and parties to the 
action; [and] (4) identity of the quality in 
the persons for or against whom the claim is 
made. 
City of Pittsburgh v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 559 A.2d 896, 901 
(Pa. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Davis v. United States 
Steel Supply, 688 F.2d at 170-71 (applying Pennsylvania law).  
Moreover, "'[i]t is well settled, as a general proposition, that 
a judgment or decree, though entered by consent or agreement of 
the parties, is res judicata to the same extent as if entered 
after contest.'"  Keystone, 360 A.2d at 194 n.6 (citation 
omitted).  See also Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d 
Cir. 1972) ("[d]ismissal with prejudice constitutes an 
adjudication of the merits as fully and completely as if the 
order had been entered after trial") (citing Lawlor v. National 
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327, 75 S.Ct. 865, 868 (1955)).  
Thus, the fact that the dismissal with prejudice of the 1985 suit 
was based upon a stipulation by the parties is irrelevant. 
 Nonetheless, we conclude that the dismissal with 
prejudice of the 1985 suit is not res judicata in Allegheny 
International's present suit for insurance costs.  Although the 
suits involve the same parties, they do not involve the same 
causes of action.  In its present insurance costs claim, 
  
Allegheny International is suing for reimbursement of expenses it 
had not even incurred at the time that its 1985 suit was 
dismissed with prejudice.  The fact that Allegheny 
International's 1985 suit included a claim for declaratory 
judgment regarding its rights to the reimbursement of future 
insurance expenses it would incur on behalf of Allegheny Ludlum 
should not bar Allegheny International's present claim for 
expenses incurred subsequent to the dismissal of the 1985 suit.15   
                     
15
.  Allegheny Ludlum cites Exner v. Exner, 407 A.2d 1342 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1979), and Mintz v. Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 595 
A.2d 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) in support of its argument that 
the dismissal with prejudice bars Allegheny International's 
present claim for costs incurred subsequent to the dismissal of 
the earlier action.  But these cases are distinguishable. 
 
 The plaintiff in Exner first filed actions in assumpsit 
alleging breaches of a separation agreement and then filed an 
action in equity alleging breaches of the separation agreement 
and seeking specific performance of the separation agreement.  
The court in Exner entered judgment in the equitable action and 
ordered specific performance of the separation agreement.  
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment 
in the consolidated assumpsit actions alleging breaches of the 
separation agreement.  The Exner court held that the assumpsit 
actions were barred by the judgment in the equitable action based 
in part on the fact that "[t]he complaint in equity recited all 
prior defaults, including those alleged in the prior assumpsit 
actions . . . [and thus,] the causes of action alleged in the 
consolidated assumpsit actions were included among the breaches 
of contract averred and decided in the equity action."  Exner, 
407 A.2d at 1344.  Thus, this case is distinguishable as 
Allegheny International's previous complaint did not and could 
not allege the "defaults" alleged in the complaint before us. 
 
 In Mintz, the court held that the plaintiffs' claims 
alleging that the defendant breached their lease agreement 
already had been fully discharged by the bankruptcy court's entry 
of an order confirming the defendant's plan of reorganization.  
The court based its determination that the doctrine of res 
judicata barred plaintiffs' claims in part on the finding that 
although plaintiffs may have incurred damages subsequent to the 
confirmation of defendant's plan of reorganization, the alleged 
  
 As the United States Supreme Court held in Lawlor v. 
National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328, 75 S.Ct. 865, 868 
(1955), while a "judgment precludes recovery on claims arising 
prior to its entry, it cannot be given the effect of 
extinguishing claims which did not even then exist and which 
could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case."16   
The plaintiffs in Lawlor had brought an antitrust action seeking, 
in part, injunctive relief, that was dismissed with prejudice in 
1943 pursuant to a settlement agreement.  Subsequently, they 
brought a second action alleging antitrust violations based on 
conduct subsequent to the 1943 judgment, and the court held that 
the earlier judgment did not bar the action.  Moreover, the court 
noted that its conclusion was "unaffected by the circumstance 
that the 1942 complaint sought, in addition to treble damages, 
injunctive relief which, if granted, would have prevented the 
illegal acts now complained of."  Id. at 328, 75 S.Ct. at 869.   
(..continued) 
breach occurred prior to the confirmation of defendant's plan of 
reorganization.  Mintz, 595 A.2d at 1244.  Thus, Mintz is 
distinguishable because the breaches on which Allegheny 
International bases its present suit occurred after the entry of 
judgment in the 1985 suit. 
16
.  See also Federated Dep't. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 
394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2428 (1981) ("[a] final judgment on the 
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that 
action.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Alexander & 
Alexander, Inc. v. Van Impe, 787 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(res judicata "applies only to claims arising prior to the entry 
of judgment.  It does not bar claims arising subsequent to the 
entry of judgment and which did not then exist or could not have 
been sued upon in the prior action.") (citation omitted). 
  
 We think that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
follow the logic of Lawlor in the situation before us.  In 
reaching this conclusion, we recognize that when declaratory 
relief is sought it may be possible to sue on a claim which could 
be regarded as not yet existing.  Yet we think that it is 
reasonable to consider that when both damages for past conduct 
and declaratory relief governing future events are sought, the 
parties naturally would focus their attention on the existing 
monetary claims.  Indeed, we believe that a court should be 
cautious in according res judicata effect to the dismissal of the 
declaratory judgment aspects of a combination damages and 
declaratory judgment action, lest a settlement leading to a 
dismissal with prejudice could have unintended consequences.  For 
example, a delinquent defendant with an ongoing relationship with 
a plaintiff, by making its account current, might obtain a 
dismissal of an action against it for the overdue payments and 
for declaratory relief that it will be liable for future 
payments.  In such a situation it would be remarkable if the 
defendant could use the dismissal of the action as a defense in a 
later case if it failed to make the future payments as its 
obligation to make them matured.   
 Furthermore, in a technical sense it is questionable 
whether a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a claim for 
declaratory relief should be regarded as extinguishing the 
anticipated substantive claim underlying the declaratory judgment 
action, for such a dismissal is in terms simply a disposition of 
a claim for declaratory relief.  Accordingly, it seems 
  
unreasonable to regard the disposition as the equivalent of a 
disposition of the plaintiff's substantive claims for monetary 
relief as the claims mature.  Indeed, at a time when the claim 
for declaratory relief is dismissed, the circumstances on which 
future liability later may be predicated will not even exist.  
Overall, we are convinced that whatever might be true in other 
contexts, for res judicata purposes a cause of action for 
declaratory relief with respect to a party's obligation to make 
payments in the future should not be regarded as a cause of 
action for the recovery of the payments as they become due.  In 
these circumstances, we conclude that the Allegheny 
International's present claim for insurance costs should not be 
regarded as stating the same cause of action asserted in the 
state litigation.  Consequently, we apply Pennsylvania law to 
hold that the dismissal of Allegheny International's 1985 suit 
does not bar its present claim.17    
                     
17
.  Of course, when there is an actual adjudication of an issue 
in a declaratory judgment action regarding a debt not due, the 
adjudication may be preclusive under collateral estoppel 
principles as to that issue in a later action to recover the 
debt.  Thus, our result in no way undermines the effectiveness of 
a declaratory judgment.  But collateral estoppel does not apply 
here because the dismissal with prejudice of the 1985 suit did 
not actually "decide" or "adjudicate" any issues.  See City of 
Pittsburgh, 559 A.2d at 901 ("[c]ollateral estoppel applies if 
(1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to one 
presented in the later case; (2) there was a final judgment on 
the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a 
party or in privity with a party in the prior case; (4) the party 
or person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is 
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 
the prior proceeding and (5) the determination in the prior 
proceeding was essential to the judgment.") (citations omitted).   
  
 
 C.  Sunbeam-Oster's standing 
 In a second and separate motion for summary judgment, 
Allegheny Ludlum challenged Sunbeam-Oster Company's right to 
prosecute this action on behalf of Allegheny International 
because Sunbeam-Oster did not file a motion to amend the caption 
of the case or otherwise substitute itself for Allegheny 
International as plaintiff.  See Allegheny Int'l, Inc., slip op. 
at 30.  The district court denied Allegheny Ludlum's motion, 
holding that Allegheny Ludlum had waived any defense it might 
have had to Sunbeam-Oster's prosecution of this action by raising 
it "as late in the litigation as it has."  Id. at 31 (citing 6A 
Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1554, 
at 406-07 (1990)).  We agree.  Any objection alleging that the 
plaintiff is not the real party in interest "should be done with 
reasonable promptness."  See 6A Charles A. Wright, et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1554, at 407 (1990).  
"Otherwise, the court may conclude that the point has been waived 
by the delay and exercise its discretion to deny motions on the 
ground of potential prejudice."  Id. at 407-08.  See also Gogolin 
& Stelter v. Karn's Auto Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100, 102-03 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant waived real-party-in-interest 
defense by "untimely assertion," where defendant raised it for 
the first time in a motion for directed verdict), cert. denied, 
494 U.S. 1031, 110 S.Ct. 1480 (1990).18      
                     
18
.  In light of our decision, we need not reach an argument 
advanced by Allegheny Ludlum that the district court erred in 
  
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 In view of the aforesaid, we will reverse the district 
court's order of summary judgment of April 7, 1994, in favor of 
Allegheny International, but we will affirm its denial of 
Allegheny Ludlum's motions for summary judgment.  We will remand 
the matter to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  The parties will bear their own 
costs on this appeal. 
(..continued) 
determining as a matter of law that Allegheny International was 
entitled to the interest the IRS paid on the refund as a tax 
benefit, and Allegheny Ludlum's further argument that the court 
should not have awarded Allegheny International prejudgment 
interest for certain litigation delay.  
